The Golden State Warriors’ regular season will end on a Sunday afternoon at Chase Center in one of Draymond Green’s favorite matchups. Against the LA Clippers. It will likely have postseason implications, so Green will no doubt be intense.
But it’s not one of his favorites for the matchup against Ivica Zubac, the bruising center he’ll have to face. Or Kawhi Leonard. Or James Harden. No, Green loves the matchup because of opposing head coach Ty Lue.
“When I’m playing against his teams,” Green said, “I feel like it’s a chess match with me and him.”
It’s a window into why Green is here, at 35 years old, still playing stellar enough defensively to be worthy of Defensive Player of the Year consideration. He’s not as fast as he once was, not as explosive as when he last won the award in 2017. His body has endured, is enduring, the typical wear and tear of a career over a thousand games long.
But Green compensates with his mind. Always a high-IQ player, Green’s advanced knowledge, accrued through six NBA Finals trips and four championships, has evolved him into an algorithmic deconstructor of offenses.
He still has some tangible strengths. He’s strong. He remains spry. He also has a 7-foot-2 wingspan he wields like a weapon. It compensates for him being only 6-foot-6. Sometimes, he’ll guard people with one hand in the air, like a fly swatter.
But the activation of these tools is his special trick. It ain’t checkers. Not to Green. He doesn’t want to win matchups; he wants to disrupt whole schemes. He doesn’t see his battle with the players on the court but with the aim of what they want to accomplish.
“Every offense in the NBA is built to put (defensive) players in a rotation,” Green said. “So if I know that, and I know the rotation … if I see that y’all are doing this or y’all (are) doing this to get to that? Great. I’m going to stand right there and f— this whole play up.
“I want everything that y’all thought y’all was going to come in this game and do, I want to take all of that s— off the table. That’s why I talk to the coaches so much. … This is my little battle with the coach. I want to f— your s— up. It’s no hard feelings. I’m always bantering and talking. But I want you to know that your offensive game plan, I wanna f— it up. … Completely destroy your offensive game plan, and then I want to let you know about it.”
What goes into the monkey-wrenching of defenses? Green sat down and broke down five plays from this season that give a window into his defensive mind. Watch the videos to hear Green’s detailed explanation.
Warriors vs. Pelicans | Oct. 30 | Chase Center
Zion Williamson went 5 of 20 in this early season showdown, back when he was healthy and spry. Green frustrated him into a rough night. He explained how he did it, using this sequence as an example.
Williamson caught the pass as he was curling into the lane. But Green, after having watched Williamson score 31 points on 12-of-19 shooting the previous night against the Warriors, altered his approach: Give Williamson space.
“I want to give myself a little distance because he’s fast and powerful. You know, quick,” Green said. “But I don’t want to give too much distance to where the momentum of the bump that he’s going to deliver, it’s gon’ move me.”
Against taller players, such as Nikola Jokić and Anthony Davis, Green has to be close enough to get a good contest. Williamson is just 6-6. So Green could give him space and still contest thanks to his wingspan.
Williamson settled for the midrange jumper and missed badly. Wide left. He managed to get the ball back, but Green hunted him down with his fly swatter and challenged his shot. He calls it the deflector hand.
“It’s the deflector,” he said. “I need the deflector going. I’ve got to get this hand up because I’m not 7 feet. If my hand goes up late, it’s a wrap. I’m 6-5.”
Warriors vs. Mavericks | Nov. 12 | Chase Center
Two plays — one early in the first quarter, another late in the fourth quarter — revealed the nuance of the chess Green plays.
Then-Dallas star Luka Dončić ran a pick-and-roll with Dallas Mavericks center Daniel Gafford on the left wing. Andrew Wiggins and Trayce Jackson-Davis trapped Dončić on the sideline. Green defended Naji Marshall. But he left Marshall to go cover Gafford.
The rotational scheme called for Green to pass off Gafford once he got below the free-throw line. Straying too far from his man would give Dončić an easy pass to an open shooter. But Green didn’t mind that shot.
“I tag Gafford because if you don’t tag Gafford, what Luka gon’ do? He’s gon’ probe, probe, he gon’ throw it right to the front of the rim to Gafford for a lob. So I’m tagging him all the way down. But I know I have a non-shooter. I know I can get back here.”
Sticking with Gafford did two things. One, it kept Stephen Curry out of rotation. He was the low man responsible for cutting off the diving big man. Since Green discouraged the pass to Gafford, preventing the roll, Curry didn’t need to rotate and could stay tethered to Klay Thompson in the weakside corner. And then-Warrior De’Anthony Melton could stick with Kyrie Irving instead of zoning up to cover both Thompson and Irving — if Curry had to rotate.
Dončić, with his roll man covered, dribbled around Jackson-Davis and drove baseline. The double-team stayed with him, and Dončić ended up under the rim. Thompson was covered by Curry, Irving by Melton and Gafford by Green.
Dončić, being such an exceptional passer, knew his lone option — though it was behind him. He wrapped a no-look, two-hand pass from the right low block to the left wing, where Marshall was wide open.
Notice Green’s back was to Dončić, whose back was to the shooter. Yet, Green had already diagnosed what Dončić would do. The ball was barely out of Dončić’s hands when Green made his move toward Marshall on the wing.
So Green freelanced the defensive scheme, baited Dončić to throw the ball where he wanted, then “jumped the route” and got one of his patented blocked 3-pointers — which was relatively easy.
Green said most defenders, when they see an open player, run toward the open man with their hands up. Since defenders are trained to get a hand up on shooters, they instinctively raise their arms while closing out. But Green said that slows the defender down.
“When I see the ball passed, I take off and sprint. At the last second, I get my hand up. Before my hand goes up, I’m on a dead sprint.”
With a bead on the play, a sprinting closeout and a 7-2 wingspan, this was an easy block of Marshall’s 3-pointer.
Oddly enough, the biggest defensive play of this game happened because Green made the opposite choice with Gafford and left the Mavericks big man open on purpose.
The Warriors were down a point with 2:21 left and needed a stop. Dončić was running a pick-and-roll with then-Maverick Quentin Grimes, trying to get Curry on Dončić. Green tried baiting Dončić into passing to Gafford. Green parked at the free-throw line in the middle, negating Grimes’ roll to the basket.
Green was aware of Gafford behind him. He wanted Dončić to feed him the ball. They’ve been in this situation before.
It worked. Dončić passed behind Green to Gafford on the baseline. Green didn’t get in front of Gafford. Instead, he essentially gave Gafford the lane to the rim.
“Because I know I can get the ball on the back side,” Green said. “… If I come to him and get my body in front of him, he’s too big. He’s just going to shoo me off and just lay it here. Me getting my body in front of him at that point, I’m at a disadvantage. My advantage is to elude his body and get the ball on the other side.”
Warriors at Rockets | Dec. 11 | Toyota Center
Houston’s Alperen Şengün had Green in the paint isolated and decided to post up the smaller Warrior. The Rockets’ big man is 6-11, 235 pounds and one of the best in the NBA with his back to the basket. But Green made quick work of him in the paint. He used his hands to keep Şengün from getting into his body.
Şengün got into the low post on the left block. But Green anticipated his move and, using the baseline as a defender, angled his body to be in the way when Şengün attempted to turn back to the middle.
“He always wants to spin,” Green said. “So when he’s going left, guess where he’s going? He’s spinning back right. So now I just need to pin him that way. I can’t let you spin back to your right hand, and you’re too deep. You’re under the backboard.”
An off-balance Şengün was easy prey. Green stripped the ball, and the Warriors were off the other way.
Warriors vs. Knicks | March 15 | Chase Center
Midway through the fourth quarter, the Warriors had taken control of the game. Green started the play on New York’s Josh Hart, a non-shooter who allowed Green to play center field. When Mikal Bridges curled off a screen, Green left Hart to stop Bridges. Green knows Bridges likes to get to his midrange pullup.
“As soon as I see him coming off the screen with a little bit of space, I’m already knowing, like, ‘Oh, I need to jump up. Because if I don’t, he’s gon’ shoot that. That’s his pet shot. So I need to put this fire out right away.”
Instead of taking his midrange shot, Bridges lofted a pass to the left wing for Knicks forward OG Anunoby. Karl-Anthony Towns set a screen on Warriors forward Gui Santos, who shadowed Anunoby. Then Towns rolled out of the screen and warded off Jimmy Butler, who was on Towns.
This resulted in a clear path to the rim for Anunoby.
Bridges, after making the pass, floated to the top. But Green didn’t follow him. He abandoned Bridges, leaving him alone behind the arc.
“I don’t think he can make this pass,” Green said. “He can’t make that pass. He don’t even see it. … He got a drive to the rim. He ain’t passing. And he was playing well? Go put the fire out.”
Ever the freelancer, Green beat Moses Moody and Butler to the rotation and cut off Anunoby on the baseline. When the Knicks forward leapt toward the front of the rim for a layup, Green blocked it to complete the play.
So Green started on Hart, switched onto Bridges, then thwarted Anunoby.
Warriors vs. Bucks | March 18 | Chase Center
The Warriors were one stop away from sealing the game. Green was on Giannis Antetokounmpo.
Antetokounmpo did a dribble-handoff (DHO) with forward Kyle Kuzma into a pick-and-roll. Buddy Hield, chasing Kuzma, zipped around Giannis to stay connected to his man. He found himself behind a screen by Giannis.
But Green didn’t drop back to cover Giannis.
“My thought process here is I’m gonna be up at the level of the screen,” Green said. “Because I’ve got to take the 3 away. We’re up 11 points with 51 seconds to go. I’ve gotta take this 3 away.”
So Green immediately ate the space between him and Kuzma. For one, he wanted to speed up Kuzma. He also wanted to make the pass harder for Kuzma. And Green already knew he couldn’t let Kuzma turn the corner and have a two-man game with Giannis rolling to the basket in open space.
“Look where Kuz catches the ball,” Green said. “He’s in a prime trap spot. He’s got the sideline. He’s got nowhere to go. … I’ve got him dead right here. Once he turns his back, I can get out now.”
Green hustled back to Giannis. Butler had rotated over to cover for Green, but now Green sent him away. He was ready for his second effort on the defensive possession.
With Giannis catching the ball farther out, Green was in a better position to defend.
“So now I can beat (Giannis) to the spot, and I can prepare myself for the shoulder because I know the shoulder is coming,” Green said. “I can take the hit.”
Green indeed absorbed Giannis’ shoulder and impeded a shot attempt. Giannis passed to Damian Lillard in the weakside corner. Green remained connected to Giannis, who drifted to the left side. But when the ball reversed to the opposite corner, Green had to give a third effort.
He sprinted out to contest an open 3 from Taurean Prince. Green closed out well enough to make Prince pump fake and step away from Green. The change was enough to disrupt Prince, and he missed.
The play began with him blowing up their pick-and-roll plans and ended with a good contest. Ball game.
(Illustration: Demetrius Robinson / The Athletic; Photos: Jed Jacobsohn / NBAE, Elsa, Thearon W. Henderson / Getty Images)