At first glance, Skenes looks like the most complete incarnation yet of a specific type of analytics-friendly pitcher, one who seems purpose-built to hurl fastballs and sliders as hard as he can for as long as he can before ceding the mound to relievers. And at some level, that’s what he is. But Skenes’s path to becoming a top pitching prospect was different from everyone else’s. As a catcher, he wasn’t exposed to a recruiting subculture that emphasizes pitch velocity and spin rate more than actually getting batters out in games. “He wasn’t on that summer grinder circuit, and doing velo programs since he was 4,” Cherington says, referring to training routines designed to increase pitch velocity. “And maybe,” Cherington added, “you start to think that he’s this good because he didn’t do all those modern pitcher things.” In fact, Skenes shows signs of evolving into another kind of pitcher, one in the image of those durable starters who preceded him. “I do think that — knock on wood — Paul Skenes has the capability, over the next two or three years, of starting to finish games,” Cherington says.
Skenes hopes so. As a former position player, he’s accustomed to being in the lineup every day and rarely being removed during a game. “The goal is to go out there and pitch nine innings every time,” he says now. “That’s not going to happen. But I try to get outs as quickly and efficiently as possible, and hopefully have the bullpen throw as little as possible.” Such efficiency was crucial when starters expected to get through games. These days, it clashes with another dictum of baseball analytics: that the only controllable outcome of an at-bat for a pitcher, at least in a positive sense, is the strikeout. Once a ball is hit, what happens next will depend on an amalgamation of factors, including the ability of the fielders, how hard the wind is blowing and pure luck. Those lazy outfield flies might just end up in the stands.
To avoid that, when pitchers get ahead in the count, they usually throw a pitch or two nowhere near the plate. “You’re going out of the zone, in the dirt, just hoping they swing,” says Logan Gilbert of the Seattle Mariners, whose 208⅔ innings last season led the majors. Trying to induce swings can add a couple of pitches per batter, the difference between finishing the sixth inning at 75 pitches and an untenable 95.
Strikeouts also get pitchers noticed. “That’s what gets you drafted high and moves you through the minors,” says Daniel Bard, a former first-round pick who pitched parts of nine seasons in the majors. “If you can do that while keeping your walks down, you can be really, really good.” Skenes’s frequency of striking out hitters is the highest of any Pirate ever. But he knows that also compromises his ability to work deep into games. To Skenes, every at-bat should end in three pitches — a three-pitch strikeout. “But at some point, I’m like, ‘OK, let’s get this at-bat over with,’” and he’ll throw a pitch designed to get a ground ball. “At the end of the day, I want to put up as many zeros as possible,” he says, referring to scoreless innings. “But if it’s just five innings and no runs, I’m not super-happy about that either.”
Neither is Manfred. Lately, Major League Baseball has shown a willingness to tinker with its rules, counteracting some of the stultifying effects of analytics-driven baseball. Among other adjustments, it outlawed the shifting of fielders from one side of second base to the other, and enlarged the bases. After last season, when Skenes’s 11-3 record and E.R.A. under 2.00 focused attention on how the role of even the top starters has changed, many of the sport’s stakeholders expected Manfred to issue some kind of edict about pitching, possibly a rule change that might be provisionally implemented in a minor league so that the ramifications could be studied. Instead, M.L.B. released a report on pitching injuries that revealed little that wasn’t already known. “I haven’t even read it,” Skenes says.